摘要
面对他人的危难情形,行为人施救或不予施救背后的行为逻辑实际上是出于对行为成本—收益的考量。通过揭示行为人见危救或不救背后的经济学逻辑可以看出,见危施救这一利他行为是理性人追求自身利益最大化的必然选择,无须刑罚的涉足便可以自行存续和发展。增设"见危不救罪"并非破解见危不救困境的良方,不仅会导致公共资源的浪费,而且公安机关为了追求自身利益最大化也缺乏破获见危不救案的有效激励,同时潜在的救助者也会通过减少引起救助发生的行为而不是通过救助来避免法律责任,"见危不救罪"的设立亦会激励潜在的受害人降低自身对于危险的预防水平,导致无效率的结果。
Facing other people＇s dangerous situations, whether a person rescues him or her depends on the weight of cost and benefit to the behavior. By analyzing the economic logics whether a person rescues people in danger or not, we can see that rescuing people in danger, a kind of altruistic behavior, is an inevitable choice as a result of the fact that a reasonable person pursues maximum benefit. This kind of behavior can exist and develop all by itself without penalty. Adding the crime of looking on unconcerned to others＇ danger is not a good way to get rid of the dilemma. Not only will it lead to a waste of public resources, but also public security organs lack the incentives to solve this kind of cases in order to pursue maximum benefit. Besides, potential rescuers will also evade legal re- sponsibility by reducing the behaviors that can lead to rescuing others rather than by rescuing people in danger. Adding the crime of looking on unconcerned to others＇ danger also impels potential victim to lower the standard of preventing and controlling danger, leading to an inefficient result.
出处
《北京化工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2012年第1期11-15,共5页
Journal of Beijing University of Chemical Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
利他行为
成本
收益
激励
altruistic behavior
cost
benefit
incentive
