期刊文献+

碳排放配额初始分配的经济效应及启示 被引量:8

原文传递
导出
摘要 碳排放权初始分配方式是影响碳排放交易有效运行的重要因素,本文利用局部均衡框架分析了三种不同碳排放权初始分配方式的经济效应,在此基础上,提出了中国在碳排放交易发展初期采取可升级的免费分配和拍卖分配相结合的混合分配方式的建议。
出处 《国际经济合作》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第3期21-24,共4页 Journal of International Economic Cooperation
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

  • 1Hahn,R.(1983).Market power andtradable property rights.Quarterly Jour-nal of Economics,99,753-765. 被引量:1
  • 2Misolek,W.,&Elder,H.(1989).Exclusionary manipulation of marketsfor pollution rights.Journal of Environ-mental Economics and Management,16,156-166. 被引量:1
  • 3Stavins,R.(1995).Transactioncosts and tradable permits.Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and Manage-ment,29,133-148. 被引量:1
  • 4Tietenberg,T.(1992):Environmen-tal and Natural Resource Economics,New York:Harper Collins. 被引量:1
  • 5Cason,T.(2003):“Buyer Liabilityand Voluntary Inspections in Internation-al Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading:ALaboratory Study”,Environmental andResource Economics,25,101-127. 被引量:1
  • 6Bohringer,C.&Lange,A.(2005),Economic implications of alternative al-location schemes foremission al-lowancesí,The Scandinavian Journalof Economics107(3),563?581. 被引量:1
  • 7Sterner,T.&Muller,A.(2008),Output and abatement effects of alloca-tion readjustment in permit trade,Cli-matic Change86(1-2),33-49. 被引量:1
  • 8Fowlie,M.(2010).Allocating E-missions Permits in Cap-and-Trade Pro-grams:Theory and Evidence.Technicalreport,University of California,Berkeley. 被引量:1
  • 9Requate T,Unold W(2003)Envi-ronmental policy incentives to adopt ad-vanced abatement technology:will thetrue ranking please stand up?.Eur EconRev47(1):125-146. 被引量:1

同被引文献69

  • 1Dales, J. H.. Pollution, Property and Prices [ M ]. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. 被引量:1
  • 2Montgomery, D. W.. Markets in Licenses and Efl'icient Pollution Control Programs[ J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1972, 5(3) :395 -418. 被引量:1
  • 3Hahn, R. W.. Market Power and Transferable Property Rights [ J ]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984, 99 (4) :753 - 765. 被引量:1
  • 4Westskog, It.. Market Power in a System of Tradable CO2 Quotas[J]. The Energy Journal, 1996, 17(3) :85 - 103. 被引量:1
  • 5Malik, A. S.. Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2002, 44(3):371 -390. 被引量:1
  • 6Malueg, D. A.. Welfare Consequences of Emission Credit Trading Programs [ J ]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1990, 18(1) :66 -77. 被引量:1
  • 7Sartzetakis, E. S.. Tradeable Emission Permits Regulation in the'Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets : Wel- fare Implications [ J ]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 1997, 9 ( 1 ) :65 - 81. 被引量:1
  • 8Hung N. M. and Sartzetakis, E. S.. Cross - industry Emission Permits Trading [ J ]. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1998, 13(1) :37 -46. 被引量:1
  • 9Chao, H. and Peck, S.. Greenhouse Gas Abatement: How Much? And Who Pays? [J]. Resource and Economics, 2000, 22(1):1 -20. 被引量:1
  • 10Shiell, L.. Equity and Efficiency in International Markets for Pollution Permits [ J ]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2003, 46( 1 ) :38 - 51. 被引量:1

引证文献8

二级引证文献44

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部