摘要
本文以2006～2009年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，在根据投资目标对机构投资者进行类型划分的基础上，探讨了机构投资者独立性对代理成本的影响。研究发现，独立机构持股比例越高，公司管理层代理成本和控股股东代理成本越低，而非独立机构持股对两类代理成本影响有限。在进一步考虑了控股股东持股比例的影响后，发现独立机构持股在控股股东偏好控制权私有收益的情况下更能降低管理层代理成本，表明在此情况下，独立机构对管理层自利行为有更大的监督作用。
Using 2006-2009 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples, we classify the different types of institutional investors according to their investment objectives and study the impact of institutional investors independence on the agency cost. The results indicate that the higher holding of independent institutions, the lower management agency cost and controlling shareholder agency cost, and the impact of dependent institutions on agency cost is limited. After considering the controlling shareholders＇ impact, we find that when controlling shareholders prefer private gains, independent institutions can further reduce management agency cost, indicating a greater supervisory role of independent institutions on the management self-interested behavior under this condition.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第1期25-30,共6页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金(项目编号:71102122)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金(项目编号:10YJC630214)]
关键词
独立机构
非独立机构
管理层代理成本
控股股东代理成本
independent institutional investors, dependent institutional investors, management agency cost, controlling shareholder agency cost
