摘要
为研究经济政策对闭环供应链的影响,以博弈论为基本工具,建立了经济政策调节下的集中决策闭环供应链模型和制造商回收的闭环供应链模型;导出了回收率、销售价及供应链利润与惩罚因子之间的函数关系;通过灵敏度分析,发现了集中决策闭环供应链中经济激励作用有一个度的问题,即惩罚因子存在一个阈值;设计了收益共享契约,实现了制造商回收再制造闭环供应链的协调和优化。通过数值分析,验证了回收率、销售价及供应链利润与惩罚因子之间的趋势关系,找到了惩罚因子的阈值和收益共享契约。
A closed-loop supply chain with the manufacturer collecting its end-of-life products is considered. The issue discussed in this paper is how the economic incentive policies impact the performance of the supply chain. A game theory model is developed for such a supply chain under the centralized decision making mode. With this model, With the penalty factor as variable, analytical expressions are obtained to calculate the recycling rate, sale price, and the supply chain profit. Then, by sensitivity analysis, it is found that, for economic incentive of product recycling, there is a threshold in regulating the penalty factor. Based on the results obtained, revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain such that the profit is maximized. A numerical example is used to verify the results presented in this paper.
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2011年第5期19-23,共5页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
山东省软科学研究计划资助项目(2009RKA173)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630241)
江苏省社会科学研究青年基金项目(10GLC012)
关键词
经济政策
闭环供应链
灵敏度分析
收益共享契约
economic incentive policies
closed-loop supply chain
sensitivity analysis
revenue-sharing contract
