期刊文献+

股权激励行为、激励水平与公司自愿性信息披露——基于《上市公司股权激励管理办法》实施后上市公司非平衡面板数据的证据 被引量:1

Stock Option Motivation,Motivation Level and Companies' Voluntary Information Disclosure——Evidence of Listed Companies' Unbalanced Panel Data after the Implementation of Regulation of Listed Companies' Stock Option Motivation
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摘要 以中国上市公司2006-2010年的非平衡面板数据研究实施股权激励的行为以及激励水平对中国上市公司自愿性信息披露程度的影响。发现:(1)股权激励行为能显著提升管理者自愿性信息披露的程度,实施股权激励后,管理者自愿性信息披露的数量和质量都得到提升;(2)激励水平与公司自愿性信息披露之间存在显著的正相关关系,激励水平越高,公司自愿性披露的数量和质量水平也越高。上述发现表明股权激励在降低公司所有者和代理人之间的信息不对称程度方面的积极作用。 The paper,based on the data of China's listed companies' unbalanced panel from 2006 to 2010,discusses the influences of stock option motivation and motivation level on China's listed companies' voluntary information disclosure.The results reveal two points: the first is that stock option motivation can greatly promote managers' voluntary information disclosure in both quantity and quality and the second is that there is a prominently positive relationship between motivation level and companies' voluntary information disclosure: the higher the motivation level,the quantity and quality of companies' voluntary information disclosure.These discoveries show that stock option motivation plays an active role in reducing information asymmetry between company owners and agents.
作者 何凡
出处 《唐山学院学报》 2011年第4期79-82,共4页 Journal of Tangshan University
关键词 股权激励 激励水平 自愿性信息披露 上市公司 stock option motivation motivation level voluntary information disclosure listed company
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