摘要
本文基于代理成本理论与信息不对称理论,聚焦深港通机制的公司治理效应,以2013—2018年深圳证券交易所上市公司作为研究样本,构建双重差分模型,研究了深港通机制能否降低上市公司代理成本的问题,通过信息透明度的中介效应检验,探究其传导机制,并进一步研究该中介效应在不同产权性质中所发挥的作用。研究发现深港通机制能够通过提高上市公司信息透明度来降低上市公司代理成本,该中介效应在民营企业中发挥的作用更为显著。基于此,本文提出监管机构可以适度扩大股票市场开放水平,同时加强对资本市场的监管,从而在优化上市公司治理水平的同时保护投资者利益,并对国有企业与民营企业制定差异化监管制度,加快国有企业混合所有制改革,从而提高国有企业的公司治理水平,降低代理成本。
Based on the agency cost theory and information asymmetry theory,this paper focuses on the corporate governance effects of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism.Based on the 2013-2018 Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies as research samples,a dual differential model is constructed to investigate whether the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism can be reduced.The agency costs of listed companies,through the intermediary effect test of information transparency,explore its transmission mechanism,and further study the role of the intermediary effect in different property rights.The research finds that the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect mechanism can reduce the agency costs of listed companies by improving the transparency of listed companies’information.The intermediary effect plays a more significant role in private enterprises.Based on this,this article proposes that regulators can appropriately expand the level of stock market opening and strengthen supervision of the capital market,thereby protecting the interests of investors while optimizing the governance of listed companies,and formulating differentiated supervision systems for state-owned and private enterprises Accelerate the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,thereby improving the corporate governance level of state-owned enterprises and reducing agency costs.
作者
韩晓雷
Han Xiaolei(School of Finance,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《金融发展评论》
2019年第11期131-147,共17页
Financial Development Review
关键词
深港通
信息透明度
代理成本
产权性质
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect
information transparency
agency costs
property rights
