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国有资源产业兼并重组政策的所有权安排与整合效率研究 被引量:4

On Ownership Arrangement and Amalgamation Efficiency in Rearrangement Policies of Stated-Resources Industry
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摘要 论文通过构建国有资源产业兼并重组模型,讨论了三种兼并重组政策的所有权安排及其整合效率问题。研究表明:国有资源产业兼并重组并不存在最优企业所有权安排,关键是要构建并完善有效的治理结构和治理机制;要使兼并重组富有效率,兼并主体的选择原则应以项目效用评价、主体专用性投资和主体权力收益为关键维度,对各兼并主体的项目客体条件、产权主体条件和治理机制的有效构建之间进行择优匹配。应用这一框架,论文对山西省煤改中的"国进民退"现象进行了新的解释,并对煤炭资源产业兼并重组效率的决定因素进行评判和分析。最后,论文提出推进我国资源产业兼并重组和山西煤炭产业改革的政策含义。 The article develops the model of stated-resources rearrangement to discuss the ownership arrangement and efficiency problems about three industry amalgamation policies.The findings show that there is no an optimal ownership arrangement but an effective governance mechanism and strcture in stated-resources industry rearrangement.To make industry efficiency, the body of amalgamation should be selected according to the optional matchs among utility valuation of the object, specific investment and power benefit of the body.Then,the article applies this framework to interpret the phenomenon of " government entering and citizens retreating" of coal resources in Shanxi province.And the article ends by providing some policy suggestions to promote resources industry amalgamation and the rearrangement of coal resources in Shanxi province.
出处 《产业经济研究》 CSSCI 2011年第2期18-27,94,共11页 Industrial Economics Research
基金 国家社科规划基金"我国矿产资源产业科学发展的体制机制问题研究"(项目编号:09BJL010) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目编号:09YJc790232) 湖南省自然科学基金项目(项目编号:09JJ3139) 湖南省高等学校科学研究重点项目(项目编号:10A008)
关键词 企业所有权 治理机制 国有资源产业 兼并重组效率 山西煤炭产业 firm ownership governance mechanism amalgamation efficiency stated-resources industry
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