摘要
指称问题是贯穿科学实在论两条基本原则(形而上学与认识论)的核心环节,它和真理问题一起构成实在论"非奇迹论证"的理论基础。以劳丹为代表反实在论针对性地提出"悲观归纳"问题,借助历史主义的案例分析方法,深刻揭示了"非奇迹辩护"推理存在的问题:科学理论的成功(包括预测和解释的成功)与其理论的指称和真理性并无因果必然联系。科学实在论针对"悲观归纳"的质疑,试图通过"拉姆齐置换"解决理论术语的指称问题,这代表了一种"结构实在论"的理论方案,它诉诸于科学理论的数学结构来答复反实在论提出的"指称"问题。
Reference is an important issue in scientific realism,it can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory.But the pessimistic induction reminds us that the history of science shows that most previously successful scientific theories were to a greater or lesser extent false.Recently,a new way has developed to solve the problems faced by realism,it proposed that Ramsey sentence realism has made a significant advance in the debate,but still left some problems for its incomplete account.
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第2期71-75,共5页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金资助(09YJC720026)
国家社科基金资助项目(10CZX013)
关键词
科学实在论
指称
拉姆齐语句
悲观归纳
scientific realism
reference
Ramsey sentence
pessimistic induction
