摘要
针对现有输配电市场中规制合谋研究多为经验性描述而缺乏理论工具分析的现实,本文基于组织合谋理论的P-S-A分析框架,构建了"政府/规制者/电网企业"三层次代理模型,考虑在激励机制中加入惩罚策略(简称"I+P"),分别进行输配电市场中防范规制合谋"I+FP"机制以及"I+VP"机制的设计,并进一步比较两种机制下不同类型企业输配电量和防范合谋效率,这对于当前电力体制改革下所进行的输配电改革是有意义的。
Almost all the existing studies of the regulation capture in electrical transmission and distribution market are limited to empirical description due to the lack theoretical analysis tools.Based on the analysis framework of the Organization Collusion theory,this paper establishes a three-tier agent model of ＂government/supervisor/firm＂.Considering an punishment device in incentives（Short for ＂I＋P＂）,we design a ＂I＋FP＂ and ＂I＋VP＂ mechanism of preventing regulation collusion in the electrical transmission and disuribution market.Further,the paper compares the outcomes of the different enterprises and the efficiency of anti-collusion in the two mechanisms.As a result,this study is of great implication to the current electrical transmission and distribution reforms.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第9期114-118,共5页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(90510016)
关键词
输配电市场
规制合谋
“I+P”机制
Electrical Transmission and Distribution Market
Regulation Collusion
＂I＋P＂ Mechanism
