摘要
分析了技术员工偷懒"囚徒困境"的形成过程,构建了技术员工股票期权管理激励的博弈模型,进行ESS博弈均衡分析,得出了防范技术员工偷懒行为的惩罚力度与股票期权管理激励因子之间的关系,在此基础上得出结论:股票期权与偷懒惩罚力度相结合,能有效预防技术员工偷懒行为.
This paper analyzed the formation process of ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ of the technical staff＇s i dleness, constructed the games models of stock option management excitation for ESS game equilibrium analysis, and obtained the relationship between stock option management excitation and the punishment for preventing the technical staff＇s idleness. From the analysis, the conclusion can be made that the combination of stock options and punishment can effectively prevent technical staff＇s idleness.
出处
《经济数学》
北大核心
2010年第3期53-58,共6页
Journal of Quantitative Economics
基金
江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目"转型期中国企业领导-成员关系的模式研究"(07SJB630014)的支持
