摘要
分析了不同期限的银行借款对企业投资行为的影响,并探讨了国有控股股权对银行借款与投资决策关系的作用。实证结果显示:相对于短期借款,长期银行借款与投资支出具有更显著的负向关系;而超额短期借款对投资支出的负向作用不显著,说明并不具有治理效应;整体上,银行借款的增量和存量对投资行为具有不同的影响,在低成长企业中银行借款的增量促进了企业的过度投资,与预算软约束的理论预期一致;而银行借款的存量对企业的过度投资行为有抑制作用,这一点支持负债的治理效应理论。在国有股权控股的低成长性公司中,银行借款的增量与投资支出存在一定的负向关系,而银行借款存量的作用不明显;这一结果支持政府股东双重性理论,国有股权减弱了银行借款存量的纪律约束作用。
We analyze the impact of bank loans on corporate investment behavior and discuss how state-owned equity influences the relationship between bank loans and investment decision.Empirical results show：（1） that compared to short-term loans,there exists a more significant negative relation between long-term loans and investment,while the negative relation of excess short-term loans to investment is not significant,which demonstrates that excess short-term loans don＇t have the governance effect;（2） that the increment and stock of bank loans affect investment differently： In low growth companies,the increment of bank loans positively correlates with overinvestment,which is consistent with theories on soft budget constraint;（3） that on the contrary,the stock of bank loans diminished overinvestment,which supports the debt governance theory;（4） that in state-owned and low growth companies,the increment of bank loans have negative effect on investment while the stock of bank loans don＇t, which supports the government double character theory that state-owned equity weakens the governance effect of the stock of bank loans.
出处
《系统工程》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第7期13-22,共10页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972101)
西安交通大学国家"985"三期工程项目
关键词
银行借款
增量和存量
成长性
国有股权
投资行为
Bank Loans
Increment and Stock
Growth
State-owned Shares
Investment Behavior
