摘要
在解释中国的经济改革和经济增长中,原先的"维护市场的财政联邦制"强调地方高的边际财政分成对地方促进市场化改革带来的重要作用,但分税制改革改变了这点。主张中央集权下晋升锦标赛作用的学者强调即使地方财政激励很低,晋升的激励也足以保证地方按照中央要求努力发展经济。对这种观点进行了反思,并把地方财政激励扩大到地方官员财务激励,可以发现,即使在分税制后,地方官员的财务激励和晋升锦标赛激励都起作用,后者的激励作用还面临一些限制。而且,这两种激励都未必导致地方的市场化改革和对内源型经济增长的推动。
According to the market-preserving federalism＇s view on China＇s economic growth, the importance of marginal fiscal sharing is stressed in order to prompt the local government＇s incentive in economic growth. But since the reform of tax distribution in 1994, this sharing is dropping in the local budgeting. As an alternative, promotion tournament is viewed as a more consistent argument for China＇s economic growth after 1994. This paper examines this view and holds that even under tax distribution the financial incentive and promotion tournament will work together to stimulate local officials but the latter is yet faced with some restrictions. The two stimulations will not necessarily promote the market reform and endogenous growth.
出处
《河北经贸大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期10-17,共8页
Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business
关键词
地方政府
财政分权
锦标赛
激励
腐败
local government
financial distribution
tournament
corruption
