摘要
我国农民工工资水平形成于农民工与企业的博弈过程中,其高低取决于双方的博弈力量。农民工在宏观、中观、微观三个层面的弱势性决定了其相对博弈力量几乎为零,其工资水平处于较低的位置,并呈现出扭曲性偏低的特征。这是我国城乡分割和重城轻乡制度安排的必然结果,而改革传统的城乡制度安排、消除农民工博弈力量的制度约束、使其工资水平真正成为市场机制作用的结果则是提高农民工工资水平的政策出路。
The level of rural-to-urban migrants＇ wage is formed in the process of the game between rural-to-urban Migrants and enterprises and depends on both sides＇ game strength. But the weakness of rural-to-urban migrants from the macro, medium and micro levels determines that their relative game strength is almost zero. The polley suggestion is reforwing the traditional urban-rural system arrangement so as to eliminate institutional constraints force of rural-to-urban migrants＇game and determine the wage level by the market mechanism.
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期116-122,共7页
Research on Economics and Management
关键词
农民工工资
博弈弱势
低水平
制度性扭曲
Rural-to-Urban Migrants ＇ Wage
Game＇ s Weakness
Low Level
Institutional Distortion
