摘要
本文从经济权力视角出发,通过包工头与农民工问题的分析,探讨一般劳动力工资是如何决定的,农民工是否有权力及应如何参与企业或项目的剩余分配。建立并推导了一般劳动力(本文特指农民工)工资决定、项目剩余分配以及有效委托人机制设计模型,在解决农民工工资与剩余分配问题的同时,得出弱势群体利益被强势主体侵占的必然性,对弱势群体第三方援助提供了理论依据。
The principal-agent theory mainly focuses on the principal-agent problems of the physical capital owner and the labor capital owner (especially for the manager of the enterprise). But in fact, in the process of the management of the enterprise, there are many problems of more-layers principal-agent relationship. All this scarcely goes to the field of the principal-agent theory. Through the relationship of the principal and the farmer-labor of the item, the paper analyses the process of the farmer-labor salary being decided and the surplus distribution as viewed from the economic power characteristic. The paper establishes and deduces the model of the farmer-labor's salary and the allocation of surplus of the item and the efficient principal-agent mechanism to solve the decided process of the labor salary and the problem of the distribution of the surplus.It points out the inevitability of the interest of the less power body taken by the more power body, and supplies the theoretic evidence of the necessity of the third party providing help for the less power party.
出处
《数量经济技术经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第6期43-53,共11页
Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics
基金
教育部重大项目(02JAZJD790008)
吉林大学人文社会科学研究项目(2003BS024)的资助。
关键词
农民工
项目剩余
经济权力
Farmer-Labor
Allocation of the Surplus
Economic Power
