摘要
在一个不发达的转轨经济系统中,政府承担着两个主要的角色,一是作为制度变迁的主体或者称为转轨主体,需要进行财政融资并投资于新制度的构建;二是作为货币当局发行货币和对货币金融体系进行控制。这样转轨经济中就出现了与新古典货币增长模型,甚至M-S范式下不发达货币增长经济不同的货币扩张路径以及福利后果。本文将政府这一双重角色纳入M-S范式的货币经济系统,探讨政府在促进制度变迁过程中的货币扩张行为、后果以及均衡的存在及其稳定性。我们的模型分析发现政府推动制度变迁的最优融资方式是发行货币,其不仅能够为政府推动转轨提供财政基础,而且还作为一项重要的资产注入私人经济满足货币需求。但在转轨完成以后,如果存在路径依赖,经济增长过度依靠外生的"制度拉动",经济的长期均衡是不稳定的。并且经济的稳定性以及货币扩张对稳态经济的影响取决于政府的货币控制能力,而这又对金融改革提出了难题。
In an underdeveloped transition economy, government occupies two roles, the one is the operator responsible to finance for the institutional change, and the other is monetary authority controlling the whole money and financial system. For the role of government it appears a special monetary expansion different neoclassical monetary growth models even the M-S model. Considering the role of government in M-S economy, this paper investigates the monetary behavior of government, results and existence and stability of long-term equilibrium. The model finds the optimal financial method is issuing fiat money comparing with tax and debt bond. For the money not only finances the institutional change but also meet the endogenous asset demand. However, once the transition ends, if path dependence exists and economic growth always depend on institutions-driven, economy is not able to achieve stability. Besides, the paper finds the stability is determined by the ability of government control, but which pulls financial reform in a dilemma.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期77-94,共18页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
山东省自然科学基金资助项目"中国转轨时期的货币扩张与通货膨胀研究"(项目编号Y2008H19)以及美国国际教育处(IIE)交流学者研究计划"Monetary Expansion
System Change and EconomicStability in China"(项目编号P-3-00006)的阶段性成果之一。
关键词
转轨主体
货币当局
制度变迁
货币扩张
均衡及其稳定性
operator of transition economy, monetary authority, institutional change, monetary expansion, equilibrium and stability
