摘要
从持零嵌入性与嵌入性的立场分析,审计不仅是对非完备性委托代理契约进行弥补的产物,也是审计方通过供给来满足委托方、受托方共同需求的商品。从委托代理理论视角解析单向传统三方审计关系可得出以下结论,即只有具有边际收益递减性的审计契约制度才能维护与实现审计本质特征,并可基于审计契约制度特征构建双向现代四方审计关系的审计模式,从博弈论视角解析确保审计本质特征得以展现的审计费用测算与其均衡结果。
Based on the perspective of zero-embedding and embeddedness,this paper analyzes audit in this way that audit is not only the product to remedy the incomplete principal-agent contract but also the demand of consigner and consignee of the audit provided by auditors.This paper explores the traditional tripartite audit relationship from the principal-agent theory to deduce the appropriate audit institution that has characteristics of diminishing marginal returns to maintain and realize essential characteristics of audit.And according to the above audit institution,it continues to construct a modern quartet audit relationship and explore the audit fee calculation and the balance outcome from the perspective of game theory to ensure the essential characteristics of audit.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期3-11,共9页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(11AZD030)
国家社科基金项目(08BJY012
11CGLO47
11CJYO13)
教育部人文社科青年基金项目(10YJC630044)
关键词
审计本质特征
单向传统三方审计关系
双向现代四方审计关系
审计制衡
审计委托人
审计受托人
essential characteristics of audit
one way traditional tripartite audit relationship
double way modern quartet audit relationship
audit balance
audit client
audit trustee
