摘要
本文通过对可能存在代理问题的绩差公司在高管变更前后的业绩变化及影响业绩变化的因素进行研究，考察了我国上市公司董事会内部治理效率对高管变更前后业绩变化的影响。研究发现：（1）在控制均值回复现象后，绩差公司的业绩在变更高管后得到改善，从而拒绝了替罪羊假说；（2）绩差公司业绩的提高，并非完全由于经营效率改善所致，业绩的提高部分来源于控股股东的支持，特别是控股股东的管理层兼任上市公司的高管时；（3）若上市公司的董事会缺乏效率，即使频繁召开会议，也没有解决问题，反而引起业绩的进一步下滑；（4）董事会的独立性对于业绩变化也有一定的影响，较强的独立性有利于提高高管变更后的公司业绩；（5）持有本公司股份的董事增加并没有体现股权的激励效应，即没有提高董事会决策质量、改善公司业绩。
By investigating the change in performance of poorly performing Chinese listed firms after top executive turnover, and its causes, this paper studies the effect of internal corporate governance efficiency on firm performance before and after the turnover. We find that （1） even after controlling for the mean-reverting phenomenon, firm performance improves after top executive turnover, rejecting the scapegoat hypothesis; （2） the performance improvement results not only from the enhancement of operational efficiency, but also from the propping activities of the controlling shareholder, especially when the successor is dually employed by the parent company of the listed firm; （3） if the board of directors of the listed firm is inefficient, frequent board meetings will not solve the problem, but worsen the performance instead; （4） the independence of the board of directors influences the performance change to a certain extent, and high independence is beneficial to performance improvement; （5） an increase in the number of directors holding shares of the listed firm does not enhance the quality of board decisions nor improve firm performance.
出处
《中国会计与财务研究》
2007年第1期1-45,共45页
China Accounting and Finance Review
关键词
高管变更
业绩变化
绩差公司
内部治理
Top Executive Turnover, Performance Change, Poorly Performing Firms, Internal Corporate Governance
