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成本分担博弈与维克里拍卖机制研究 被引量:1

A Research of Cost Sharing Game and the Mechanism of Vickrey Auction
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摘要 成本分担博弈中的平均分担机制往往导致参与人低报自己的收益率,从而导致博弈结果的无效率。笔者通过在成本分担博弈中引入维克里机制,利用参与人的占优策略——说真话,使成本分担博弈的结果实现了帕累托最优配置。 The average sharing mechanism in cost sharing game often leads to participants' reporting a yield lower than the fact, thus an ineffectiveness of the game results. Through introducing Vickrey mechanism into cost sharing game and making use of the participant advantageous strategy telling the truth, the author makes the result of cost sharing game attain Pareto optimal.
作者 刘浩
出处 《经济经纬》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期5-8,共4页 Economic Survey
关键词 成本分担 维克里拍卖 帕累托最优 cost sharing, Vickrey auction, Pareto optimal
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