摘要
在风险融资市场中,由于风险投资者和风险投资家之间存在着信息不对称,道德风险问题不可避免。因此,需要设计一种有效的激励机制来规避这一问题。考虑到现实中风险投资者和风险投资家都是有限理性的个体,结合行为经济学和委托代理理论,针对具有公平心理偏好的风险投资者和风险投资家,构建一种新的支付模式,通过设计有效的激励机制,为风险投资者建立合理的支付契约提供依据。
In venture financing market, due to the information asymmetry between venture investors and venture capitalists, moral hazard always occurs. So it is necessary to design an effective incentive mechanism to avoid such problems. Combining behavioral economics and the principal - agent theory for venture investors and venture capitalists with fairness preference, this paper designs an effective incentive mechanism in a new pay off pattern,and provides a reasonable pay off contract as reference to the fair - preferenced venture investors.
出处
《经济评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第1期14-18,共5页
Economic Review
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划基金(08JA630062)
关键词
激励机制模型
公平心理偏好
风险投资
Incentive Mechanism Model
Fairness Preference
Venture Capital
