摘要
本文基于中国股权分置改革的特殊制度背景,以中国上市公司为样本,就股权结构对现金股利政策的影响进行了实证分析。实证结果发现,绝对控股结构的公司在股权分置改革前后一直存在现金股利的"隧道效应";而在股权制衡结构的公司中,大股东之间的相互监督和制衡有效限制了控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占行为;股权分置改革前后,不同股权结构上市公司的股利支付水平和稳定性也存在差异。因此,上市公司股权结构的合理化调整应成为保护中小投资者利益的重要手段。
Taking the non-tradable shares reform into consideration, the paper gave an empirical study on the relationship of shareholding structure and dividend payout policy in China＇s listed companies, after which we drew the following conclusions. Firstly, when a company was absolutely controlled there was always a tunneling on dividend payout policies. Secondly, when a company was restrictively controlled, other large shareholders would play a supervision role and the tunneling on dividend payout policy by the controlling shareholders would be somehow restricted. Thirdly, changes were observed before and after the non-tradable shares reform： the dividend payout rate was increased, and the characteristics of the three types of companies with different shareholding structures appeared themselves after the reform.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第12期128-138,共11页
China Industrial Economics
关键词
股权结构
现金股利政策
股权分置改革
实证研究
shareholding structure
dividend pavout poliey
non-tradable shares reform
empirieal study
