摘要
与封闭性地区主义不同,开放性区域组织主张建立一种广泛、非歧视性的合作模式,然而这一模式不可避免地容易导致非成员国免费搭便车现象的出现,并由此带来成员国的福利损失。基于三个代表性国家的古诺博弈模型,本文分析了搭便车问题对开放性区域合作的可能影响。研究发现,尽管加入开放性区域组织能够提高成员国福利水平,然而搭便车现象的外部效应,又使得成员国往往具有退出动机;对这一问题的解决,取决于加入开放性地区组织能否使得成员国在其他方面(国内企业产出效率提高)获取较高收益,从而抵消搭便车导致的福利损失。
Contrary to closed regionalism,open regionalism highlights a pattern of general and non-discriminatory regional cooperation,which inevitably causes the phenomenon of free rider and thus the loss of member countries' welfare. Based on a Cournot game model of three countries,this paper investigates the effects of free rider on open regionalism. It has been found that even though open regionalism may benefit member countries ,the externality of free rider provides exit incentive for them. The key solution depends on whether other benefits open regionalism may bring can make up for such welfare loss due to free rider problem.
出处
《南开经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期79-89,共11页
Nankai Economic Studies
基金
教育部重点基地重大项目"WTO新议题对APEC贸易投资自由化
便利化的影响"(05JJD790016)
"APEC贸易便利化研究"(08JJD790135)
"东盟盟自由贸易区与东亚经济合作研究"(03BGJ008)的资助