摘要
运用新制度经济学关于价格管制以及租金分配的理论,对民营企业融资中遭遇的规模歧视与所有权歧视问题所作的分析表明:利率管制的租金创造与银行产权国有的制度安排,使代理人的外部与内部监督机制失效,是规模歧视与所有权歧视生发的内生经济逻辑。只有建立利率的市场形成机制、坚持国有银行的股份制改革、完善内部与外部监督机制,才能减少代理人机会主义行为动机,消除民营企业融资中的规模歧视与所有权歧视,才能一定程度上缓解我国民营企业融资难问题。
This paper gived the explanation to the ownership and scale discrimination in the Private enterprise financing, based on the theory about price control in New Institutional Economics. The analysis indicated that it was the controlled interest rates and the state-owned bank in the property rights system that caused the expire of agent＇s exterior and the internal supervising mechanism, which was the endogenous economical logic that private enterprises in financing faced ownership and scale discrimination. Only when the market forming system of the interest fate＇s was established and the joint stock system reforming of the state-owned bank was finished, which could reduce the agent＇s opportunism behavior and eliminate the ownership and scale discrimination in the Private enterprise financing, could the problem of the private enterprises financing in China be alleviated in a certain extent.
出处
《成都理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2009年第4期14-18,共5页
Journal of Chengdu University of Technology:Social Sciences
关键词
利率管制
民营企业融资
规模歧视
所有权歧视
the controlled interest rates
private enterprise finacing
scale discrimination
ownership discrimination
