摘要
本文以沪深股市的电力上市公司为样本,从公司治理、债务约束机制和自由现金流量相互关系的角度实证分析了电力上市公司的过度投资行为。探讨了公司治理结构、制度环境和债务在抑制过度投资中的作用。研究结论表明:(1)我国电力上市公司存在过度投资行为,但和自由现金流的关联度并不显著;(2)公司治理特征变量与自由现金流量的过度投资行为存在显著负相关关系;(3)债务约束效应在发电行业并没有发挥应有的作用,本文从制度的角度对这一现象进行了解释。
Based on listed companies of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, We make an empirical analysis of corporate excessive investment behavior from the perspective of relations between corporate goverance, debt constraints and excessive investment of free cash flow. At the same time, we also explore the role of rules and regulations in excessive investment. Research shows ： （ 1 ） To a larger extent, Chinese power - listed companies did not exist excessive investment of free cash flow ; （2） Corporate governance constraints effect play its clue role in power - listed companies. （3） Debt constraints effect doesn＇ t play its due role in power - listed companies.
出处
《科学决策》
2009年第11期35-42,共8页
Scientific Decision Making
基金
国家社科基金项目(08CJY012)
国家自然科学基金项目(70740007)
关键词
公司治理
自由现金流
过度投资
债务控制效应
Corporate governance
Free cash flow
Excessive Investment
Debt constraints effect
