摘要
高管薪酬机制既是资本市场辉煌的动力,也是全球性经济危机的诱因。金融危机背景下"正面我赢,反面你输"的单向保护高管利益的扭曲薪酬机制面临反思。在薪酬机制从现金薪酬向股权薪酬过渡,股权薪酬与业绩脱钩,高管薪酬公平议价面临遭遇质疑之际,行政强制的限薪措施只是一种临时的激进措施,程序合理化与信息公开化为基石的公司治理是解决高管薪酬的方向。
Executive's compensation mechanism is not only the impetus of capital market development, but also the inducement of global economic crisis. Underlying the setting of financial endanger, the system of unilaterally protecting the interests of executive's compensation should be challenged. As the compensation theory changing from cash incentive to share incentive, share pay without performance, impartiality of executive pay procedure encounter inquiry. Compulsively restricting executive's compensation by government just have occasional and radical efficacy. And better corporate governance based on rational procedure and public information rules will solve the puzzle of executive pay.
出处
《法律科学(西北政法大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期123-130,共8页
Science of Law:Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law
基金
司法部项目<义务的边与责任的界-公司诉讼的司法逻辑>(06SFB3021)
吉林省社科基金项目(2008BFX04)的成果之一
关键词
高管薪酬
公司治理
股权激励
信息披露
executive compensation
corporate governance
share incentive
information disclosure