期刊文献+

考虑价格上限的发电容量投资模型与分析 被引量:4

Electricity generation capacity investment model and policy analysis in consideration of price caps
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摘要 运用实物期权理论,将价格上限管制因素纳入发电容量投资决策模型,运用MATLAB软件进行算例分析,探讨市场变量和管制变量发生变化时发电企业的投资行为及其市场均衡效应.结果表明:1)企业对未来需求增长的预期较高时,将延迟投资并在投资时提高装机容量;2)需求波动率比需求增长率对投资决策有更大影响;3)合理的价格上限水平对减缓投资波动有明显效果;4)提高容量电价能够降低投资临界值并增加一次性投资数量,同时也会降低资源配置效率,不利于电源结构优化调整;5)不确定需求条件下,高容量电价和低价格上限的管制政策组合是实现电力市场长期均衡的有效途径. Using the real option theory, this paper introduces regulation of price cap into the decision model of generating capacity investment, make analysis of examples by MATLAB software, and then discusses investment behavior of generation enterprise and equilibrium effect of market when market variable and regulation variable change. The result of the analysis shows that : 1 ) When the growth expectation of generation enterprise on power demand is high, it will postpone its investment project and increase generation capacity in project; 2) The impact of demand fluctuation rate on investment decision is much greater than demand increment rate ; 3 ) The reasonable level of price cap has an obvious effect on alleviation of investment' s fluctuation; 4) When the electricity capacity price is raised, it not only reduces the investment marginal value but also increases the amount of initial investment. However, under this condition, the efficiency of resource allocation is reduced and it is also not favorable to optimize and adjust the electricity industrial structure; 5 ) Under the uncertainty situation of demand, the regulation policy mix of higher capacity price and lower price cap is an efficient path, which leads to long-term equilibrium of electricity market.
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第5期53-60,共8页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY079) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473008) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助(NCET-07-0124)
关键词 价格上限 容量电价 发电投资 实物期权 price cap capacity price generation capacity investment real option
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参考文献29

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