摘要
垄断优势外的竞争优势难以复制给抢先投资进入的企业带来正的效应,竞争给抢先进入的企业造成负的外部性,本文建立了考察上述两种竞争导致作用不对等情形下的期权博弈模型。通过数值分析,发现竞争优势越大会激励企业更早抢先进入,负外部性越大,追随者的企业进入门槛值会减少,并给出简要的经济学含义。
Leader＇s firm holds competition advantage besides monopoly advantage that is difficult to reproduce by other firms. Negative externalities on leader＇s firm are coming from competitor. The option game model is set up under the above two asymmetric competition cases. The conclusion is drawn through modeling and simulating that the more competition advantage, the more firm has incentive to preempt ; the more negative externalities, the lesser the follower＇s entry threshold. The simple economics implication is presented.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第11期75-78,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70331001)
关键词
期权博弈
技术创新
不对称
竞争
Game Option
Technology Innovation
Asymmetry
Competition
