摘要
作为创业投资中关键的激励力量,控制权在相当长时间里没有得到理论界的重视.本文结合创业投资实际情况界定了名义控制权和实际控制权概念,基于不完全合同理论建立了创业资本家和企业家双方之间的控制权转移的两期模型.模型在分析了创业投资中名义控制权和实际控制权的转移特征.结论认为,由于道德风险、逆向选择、风险偏好、财富约束等方面的约束,创业资本家通常利用一定的控制权来防范投资风险,并给出了这两类控制权及其影响因素之间的关系.
To develop the research of control between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist in venture capital, the formal control and real control are given in this paper. And a two - period model is founded based on the incomplete contract theory to study the incentive of control rights in venture capital. Some conclusions are given. Because of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk preference, venture capitalists are often in defense of investment risk by control rights.
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第8期175-178,共4页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology
