摘要
"985工程"政策的执行效果直接关乎我国科教兴国战略的实现。运用新制度经济学中的委托代理理论模型分析了"985工程"政策执行中存在的三种委托代理关系:政府与项目学校之间的委托代理关系、项目学校与"平台"、"基地"之间的委托代理关系和"平台"、"基地"与"成员"之间的委托代理关系,并揭示出这三种委托代理关系下因利益目标冲突和信息不对称而引发的委托代理问题——道德风险问题,从而进一步提升"985工程"政策执行的效果。
Implementation of the ＂Project 985＂ as a basic innovation policy including 39 China＇s prestigious universities plays an important role in the strategy of revitalizing China through science, technology and education. Based on the principal-agent theory model in the new institutional economics, the three principal-agent relationships in the whole implementation process of the ＂Project 985＂ are analyzed, ie. , the government-university, university-base/platform and base/platform-member relationships. It is revealed that the three relationships will cause a moral hazard between the principal and agent.
出处
《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期342-346,350,共6页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
关键词
985工程
新制度经济学
委托代理关系
＂Project 985＂
new institutional economics
principal-agent relationship
