摘要
建立了委托—代理模型对高校教师"道德风险"问题成因进行分析。确定了不对称信息下的契约特征,得出高校教师存在"道德风险"的原因是学校与教师间的信息不对称。结论指出防范与规避"道德风险"的关键是建立激励机制。
This article analyses the moral hazard problem of the university faculty using the principal-agent model. The model helped us to confirm the new characteristics of the contract between principal and agent. The causes of moral hazard is mainly due to information asymmetry. The main conclusion is that the key to reduce moral hazard of the university faculty is the establishment of incentive mechanisms.
出处
《周口师范学院学报》
CAS
2009年第3期111-113,共3页
Journal of Zhoukou Normal University
基金
周口师范学院2008年教学改革项目"高校教师‘道德风险’问题分析"(J200838)
关键词
委托—代理模型
道德风险
高校教师
principal-agent model
moral hazard
university faculty
