摘要
以挣值管理(EVM)中的计划差异(SV)和成本差异(CV)为基础,建立了一个简单但更综合的业绩测度,并基于该测度建立了委托-代理模型。通过该模型,证明了最优激励合同的存在性和惟一性,并给出了最优合同参数的计算方法。进一步分析了外生参数对激励效果(期望项目业绩)的影响。结果表明,给定其他参数,项目期望业绩:①随着代理人的能力水平的增加而提高;②随着代理人的风险厌恶程度的增加而降低;③随着项目外部环境的不确程度的增加而降低;反之亦然。
This paper constructs a simple but more comprehensive performance measure with the schedule variance （SV） and the cost variance （CV） and builds a principal-agent model based on the constructed performance measure. By the model, it proves the existence and uniqueness of the optimal incentive contract and provides the method to calculate the contract parameters. Further, the impacts of exogenous parameters on the expected project performance are analyzed. The results show that given the values of other parameters, the expected project performance, （1） increases as the agent＇s competency increases; （2）decreases as the agent＇s degree of risk aversion increases; （3） decreases as the uncertainty of the external environment of the project in question increases, and vice versa.
出处
《系统管理学报》
北大核心
2009年第2期147-152,共6页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
教育部科学技术研究重点资助项目(105149)
教育部博士点基金资助项目(20030614011)
信息产业部软科学资助项目
关键词
项目管理
挣值
挣值管理
激励合同
project management
earned value
earned value management
incentive contract
