摘要
本文在股东与经理仅具有有限理性的前提下,运用演化博弈方法对股权激励实施过程中,经理信息披露策略选择与股东策略选择的互动机制进行了分析。结果表明:当经理信息操纵的收益大于信息操纵的成本时,经理的信息披露策略依赖于股东监控的概率大小。当股东监控的收益大于监控的成本时,股东是否监控取决于经理选择信息操纵策略的概率大小。保持适度的股权激励水平、增强资本市场的有效性、加强监管、加重惩罚能降低经理信息操纵的概率。
In this paper,considering that the shareholders and manager are bounded rationality,We analyze the interaction between the executives＇ information disclosure policy and the shareholders＇ policy by using evolutionary game theory.The results are： when the gain of information manipulation is larger than the cost,the manager＇ policy relies on the probability of shareholder＇ monitor;when the gain of monitor is larger than the cost,whether the shareholders monitor or not decided by the probability of information manipulation. To keep moderate stock-based compensation,strengthen the efficiency of security market,monitor strictly and penalty heavily can decrease the information manipulation.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期139-142,共4页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70603050)
关键词
股权激励
信息披露
监控
演化博弈
stock-based compensation
information disclosure
monitor
evolutionary game
