摘要
由于信息问题,委托人不能观测到企业经营者工作的努力程度,因此,委托人需要对企业经营者进行激励和监督。文章探讨了将代理人的努力水平系数和努力成本系数引入最优激励机制模型中,通过模型的设计与求解给出相应的最优激励系数和代理人的努力程度,分析了各种影响因素,最后给出改善委托代理关系的策略。
Because of information problems, the agent can not observe how hard the client works, so he needs to motivate and supervise the client of his corporation. This paper attempts to put the operating standard coefficient and manufacturing cost coefficient into the optimal excitation mechanism model, in order to get the corresponding optimal motivating coefficient and know how hard the client works, through the design and calculation of the model. This paper analyzes all kinds of affecting elements and finally, offers some strategies of how to improve the relationship between agents and clients.
出处
《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2008年第5期78-81,共4页
Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition
关键词
契约
激励机制
优化
agreement
excitation mechanism
optimization
