摘要
我国现行的财政监督模式,是一种行政型财政监督模式。它在结构上呈现四边形的特点,具有较强的不稳定性。博弈分析表明,这种模式会导致政府失去外在约束,走向偷懒或违规。政府官员如将主要精力集中于处理上下级关系上,将不利于增加产出。因此。行政型财政监督模式需要向立法型财政监督模式转变。
Current financial superving model in China is administrative-financial one, the structure of that has the characteristic of Quadrilateral, and is not very stable. Analysis shows this pattern will induce government becomed lazy and gets out of line without external constraint. If government officials mainly focus on dealing with a superior- subordinate relationship, it will not benefit to increase their output. Therefore, the supervising model should be changed from administrative to legislative finance.
出处
《改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期68-74,共7页
Reform
关键词
财政监督
模式
博弈
financial supervision, mode, game
