摘要
构建了由地方政府和排污企业两者组成的博弈框架,比较了简单模型、"政府苏醒"模型及"政府唤醒企业"模型3种情况下的博弈均衡状况,借此分析不同条件下的政策实施效果。结果表明:①小企业是地方政府的治理重点;②地方政府单方面行动效果有限;③惩罚措施比激励措施效果显著;④地方政府坚持引导,提高企业环保意识,使之主动放弃偷排行为,方能达到社会总体效益最大化。
A game model was established to study the behavior between local government and pollutant discharge factories. The game equilibrium is analyzed under three models： the simple model, the ＂government-revival＂ model and the ＂government-awakening factory＂ model. The effects of the policies under different conditions are studied. The results indicate that： （1） the key treatment objective is small factories; （2） there will be little effect if government alone takes action; （3） punishment is more effective than encouragement; and （4） the best choice for local government is to improve the factories＇ consciousness of environmental protection, as social benefits will be maximized only when the factories give up illegal drainage.
出处
《水资源保护》
CAS
北大核心
2008年第6期108-111,共4页
Water Resources Protection
基金
河海大学人文社科基金(XZX/07B003-02)
关键词
蓝藻治理
博弈
博弈均衡
treatment of blue algae
game
game equilibrium
