摘要
中小企业的“强位弱势”现象同时表明了中小企业需要政府扶持和政府扶持效果的有限性。主流经济学以经济人假设分析政府行为，从行为经济学和演化博弈的视角看，政府不是具有严格意义上假设的经济人，但是由经济人所组成。政府政策制定者在一定程度上超越各种具体利益，追求公共利益。但政府本身不是一个整体，政府内部利益集团的存在使得政府行为就存在因为追求自身利益而偏离社会公共利益的可能性。这个观点在湖南中小企业的调查中得到了验证：扶持政策相对较完善而执行不佳，企业和政府机会主义行为的双重干扰放大了扶持政策的偏差效应。从行为经济学的视角看，适当开放扶持政策的立法程序和强化过程的程序化管理是提高中小企业扶持政策效果的有效途径。
The phenomenon of strong position and weak power of SME shows that their need of the government＇s support and also the limit of the supporting effects. The mainstream economics makes an analysis on the government behavior based on the hypothesis of economic person. From the view of behavioral economics and evolvement game, the government is not the proper hypothetical economic person, but composed of economic persons. The decision makers of government policy have pursued the public interests beyond all kinds of special interests to some extent. However, the government is not the whole, and the existence of different interest groups in government leads its behaviors to the odds of pursuing their self--interests against their social public interests, which has been proved in the investigation of Hunan＇s SME. The support policies are comparatively complete but not been executed well, and the two--side in- terference of opportunisms of enterprises and governments enlarge the deviated effects of support policy. From the angle of behavioral economics, opening the law programming process properly and strengthening the programming management of the process are the valid means of improving the effects of support policy for SME.
作者
欧阳文和
夏杰长
李坚飞
OUYANG Wen-he, XIA Jie-chang, LI Jian-fei （1. Institute of management of enterprises, Changsha Human University of Commerce, Changsha 410205, China; 2. Institute of Finance and Trade Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 100836, China）
出处
《徐州工程学院学报》
2008年第6期24-30,共7页
Journal of Xuzhou Istitute of Technology
基金
基金项目：本文是国家社科重点课题《我国支持中小企业发展的政策和服务体系研究》（批准号07AJY001）和湖南省社科重大课题《湖南完善中小企业发展政策支持体系研究》（批准号06ZD07）的阶段成果.
