摘要
中国国有银行的改革节奏自2004年以来陡然加速,而围绕改革方式及其绩效的议论和争执也接踵而至。本文试图通过梳理国有银行市场化改革过程中国家、国有银行体系以及其他当事人之间的复杂关系,在理论上为人们提供一个判断和估价改革绩效的全新框架和角度。为了厘清国有银行问题的要害和来龙去脉,本文从一开始就切入国有银行这种特殊金融制度安排的内部机理,结果发现,国家与国有银行体系曾经订立过一份特殊的金融合约,其要害是前者通过风险救助承诺换取经由后者提供的金融支持,随后的改革过程便合乎逻辑地围绕这份合约的调整而展开。可是虽经几番合约调整,风险救助承诺非但未能如国家所预期的那样被成功转移,反而蜕变为一种无形资本凝结于国有银行的资本结构之中;原本出于支持改革而刻意设置的利差补贴也就因此成为扭曲国有银行利益激励进而诱导其机会主义行为的因素。本文随后的讨论揭示出,国家与国有银行对于改革收益的时间偏好差异为后者通过扩张资产负债规模、增加账面利润从而获取短期红利提供了空间,资产负债规模的扩张又通过提升国有银行市场化改革之于宏观经济的敏感度而不断内生着对国家金融控制的需求,最终改革被牵入两难困局。本文的结论是,国有银行市场化改革的要害并不在于追求一些技术指标的短期改进,而在于通过有效的制度替换削减银行行为的外部性。
The reform of China's state-owned banks (CSOB) has been suddenly accelerated since 2004, and the comments and arguments about the ways of reform and their performance have arrived successively. In this paper, we will attempt, by combing out and discovering the complicated relations built up in the process of the marketization of CSOB between the state, the CSOB system and other parties concerned, to offer a brand new theoretic framework and perspective of judging and evaluating the achievements of reform. In order to find the crucial points of the problem of CSOB and sorting out its ins and outs, we will start from the study of the internal mechanism of the arrangement of CSOB—a special financial system. Our findings are that the state and CSOB have signed a special financial contract, the key points of which are that the former will exchange the promise to render assistance to the latter in time of the latter facing risks for financial support to be offered by the latter; and that the subsequent process of reform began according to this contract and continued logically with the adjustments of this contract. Ironically, after several rounds of adjustments, the above-mentioned promise has not been successfully transferred as the state anticipated, instead, it has degraded into an intangible asset of CSOB; hence, the subsidy for interest rate spread——the subsidy meticulously designed originally for the support of reform, has turned into factors that have twisted the purpose to promote the benefit of CSOB and that have induced their opportunist behavior. Then, we will revealed that the difference in time preference, of the state and CSOB, for the benefit from the reform has, by expanding the scale of assets and liabilities and by increasing book profits to gain short-term bonus, provided space for the latter, that the expansion of the scale of assets and liabilities has, by increasing the sensitivity of the marketization reform of CSOB to the macro economy, kept having the endogeny of the demand for the financ
出处
《管理世界》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第11期13-31,共19页
Journal of Management World
基金
2007年度国家社会科学基金重点项目"科学发展观与新时期深化中国金融体制改革的政策选择"(项目批准号:07AJY015)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目(05JJD790097)
"北京地区高等学校学科群建设项目--首都经济"专项资金的支持
