摘要
我国自上世纪末推行客户经理制以来,其独特的代理与营销方式为银行利润的增长及业绩增加带来了益处,使客户经理在银行的地位与作用迅速上升,成为我国商业银行当前人力资源管理中的重点对象,但在发展过程中出现了一些问题,如何有效地激励约束客户经理的行为,并防范道德风险成为当前亟需解决的研究课题之一。本文旨在通过揭示商业银行客户经理的委托代理特征,结合我国商业银行内控制度现状等分析了客户经理道德风险出现的成因,并提出一些可行对策建议。
Since the client manager system was put in use in our country from the late 20th century, its unique way of acting as an agent and its role of marketing have benefited many banks in gaining profit and increasing business volume. The status and function of client managers have risen rapidly, thus they have become the most important ones who we must considerably treat with through our human resource management processes. However, problems occurred along with the advantages which this new system has brought to the bank industry, that is, how to effectively inspire and restrict the client manager＇s behavior toward working and how to prevent moral hazard. This paper aims at discussing the possible countermeasures by using the principal-agent theory and intramural mechanism of commercial banks to analyze this matter.
出处
《未来与发展》
CSSCI
2008年第9期78-80,F0003,共4页
Future and Development
关键词
人力资源
委托代理
道德风险
防范对策
human resource
principal-agent analysis
moral hazard
prevention countermeasures
