摘要
从团队规范的视角分析了同事压力与团队激励的关系。依据规范对团队成员努力方向的不同影响定义了两种同事压力函数:进取型同事压力及平衡型同事压力。利用委托-代理理论模型化了不同的压力类型对团队成员均衡的努力选择及管理者最优激励系数设置的影响,并将其进行对比分析得出一些结论与启示。
From the perspective of the team norms, The paper analyzed the relations of peer pressure and team incentive. According to the effects of norm towards team member＇ s efforts, we have defined two kinds of peer pressure function： enterprising peer pressure and balanceable peer pressure. Using principal-agent theory this paper analyzed the team member＇ s Nash equilibrium efforts and the principal＇ s optimal incentive under different peer pressure, and gain some conclusion and revelation.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
2008年第3期138-140,共3页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
