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存在生产外部性的任务分配问题分析 被引量:1

The Analysis on the Optimal Task Assignment with Production Externalities
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摘要 企业的任务分配决策直接决定企业的最终收益,而生产外部性是影响企业最佳任务分配方式选择的关键因素。考虑任务分配的两种生产外部性,即专业化分工的效率优势和任务多样化的互补优势,运用委托代理理论,研究两种生产外部性同时存在时企业最佳任务分配方式的选择问题。模型给出了不同情况下的均衡结果,根据均衡结果做进一步分析表明,当专业化分工比任务多样化具有相同或更大的生产优势时,最佳的任务分配方式是专业化分工;而当任务多样化具有相对大的生产优势时,最佳的任务分配方式是不确定的,企业的最佳选择由生产外部性、任务的观测误差以及相似任务之间观测误差的差距同时决定。 The decision of enterprises' task assignment determines the final profits directly. The production externality is the key factor which influences the optimal task assignment. Considering two kinds of production externality : efficiency advantage of the specialization and complementary advantage of job diversification, and based on principal-agent theory, the choosing problem of optimal task assignment when two kinds of externality exist is studied. The model presents the equilibrium outcomes in different conditions. According to the equilib- rium outcomes, some conclusions are founded: the optimal way of task assignment is specialization in the condition that specialization has more production advantage than job diversification; on the contrary, the optimal task assignment is uncertain. The optimal choice is affected by the three factors: production externality, observation error of the task and the disparity on the observation error of the tasks.
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 2008年第4期25-30,共6页 Journal of Management Science
关键词 生产外部性 任务分配 专业化分工 任务多样化 委托-代理 externality task assignment specialization job diversification principal-agent
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