摘要
由于股东和经理之间存在信息不对称而产生的代理成本问题,使得经理有过度投资的倾向,但是原有过度投资的检验方法并未能准确地界定过度投资行为。本文在综合考虑项目投资的期限、投资的行业差异和投资收益情况因素后确定了过度投资行为的判断标准,在此基础上进行过度投资的识别可以更好地发现存在过度投资的企业,并为进一步研究过度投资的治理提供准确的数据支持。过度投资上市公司在负债比例、投资年度的收益以及是否处于战略扩张阶段等方面和其他上市公司存在显著差异。
Because of the existing question of the agency cost which was brought by the asymmetrical infor- mation between the managers and the stockholders,the managers were prone to take the action of over- investment.But the current test methods didn't provide the accurate definition of over-investment.This paper defines the concept of over-investment behavior with relevant data,and puts forward the identification standard of over-investment.It also analyses the characteristics of the over-investment listed companies and finds that there are remarkable differences between those companies and other listed ones.
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期80-85,共6页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
过度投资
代理成本
上市公司
Over-investment
Industrial Factor
Agency Cost
