摘要
期权博弈模型很好地权衡了不确定性因素和竞争性因素,文章总结了投资竞争者相互博弈的4个阶段,对双寡头垄断期权博弈模型进行了推广;考虑在序贯均衡阶段有n个竞争者相互博弈的情况,每个投资者都能够找到自己的最优投资时机激发点,且假设每家企业所付出的成本各不相同,即不对称多寡头垄断期权博弈模型,并结合案例分析证明了其可操作性。
The option-game model better balances the factors between investment uncertainty and competition. This paper summarizes the four stages in mutual gaming of the investment competitors and generalizes the duopoly option-game model to asymmetric more oligopolistic monopoly option-game model. There are more than two competitors whose presumed number is n in mutual gaming at the stage of sequence equilibrium. Each investor can find his own optimal timing of investment. It presumes that the cost of each investor is not the same. The calculation process is shown by a case study.
出处
《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第5期759-762,共4页
Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science
基金
安徽省人文社科重点研究基地资助项目(2005sk012)
关键词
期权博弈
投资时机
序贯均衡
option game
timing of investment
sequence equilibrium
