摘要
合作是社会生活普遍存在的现象,合作联盟的利益分配是人们关注的一个重要问题。提出歧视分配的概念,通过歧视分配定义合作博弈的稳定核,给出了稳定核非空的充要条件(合作博弈联盟稳定的特征),指出了严格凸合作博弈的稳定核非空并获得了τ-值在稳定核中的一个充分条件。
In this paper, the concept of scornful allocation and the concept of stable core of cooperative game are introduced. The authors present a sufficient and necessary condition for a cooperative game which has non - empty stable core, proof that strictly convex cooperative game has non - empty stable core and obtain a sufficient condition for τ - value being in the stable core.
出处
《四川文理学院学报》
2008年第2期8-10,共3页
Sichuan University of Arts and Science Journal
基金
重庆邮电大学自然科学基金资助项目(A2006-54)
关键词
合作博弈
稳定核
严格凸
核心
cooperative game
stable core
strictly convex
core
