摘要
本文引入利益相关者,并考察了利益相关者数目完全信息条件下和不完全信息条件下旅游资源开发者的行为。通过对有关合约结构的分析,本文认为,完全信息条件下固定合约和分成合约并不会影响旅游资源开发者的行为,但是,在不完全信息条件下,旅游资源开发者却会由于利益相关者的序贯介入而掉入"公共地陷阱",并且会由于开发者的不完美预期,进一步导致旅游资源开发过程中出现"反公共地悲剧"现象。
Through an analysis of the concerned contract structure with an introduction of shareholders and an examination of tourism developers＇ behavior under the conditions of complete as well as incomplete information of shareholder number, this author argues that the fixed contract and shared contract do not affect the developers＇ behavior under the condition of complete information, but under the condition of incomplete information the sequential involvement of shareholders can lead the developers to ＂the trap of the commons＂, and in turn lead to ＂the tragedy of the anti-commons＂ in the course of tourism resources development due to the developers＇ imperfect expectation.
出处
《四川师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期133-139,共7页
Journal of Sichuan Normal University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
2006年"上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金"项目(项目编号:79001301)
关键词
旅游资源开发
旅游资源经营行为
利益相关者
“公共地陷阱”
“反公共地悲剧”
tourism resources development
tourism resources operation
shareholder
＂the trap of the commons＂
＂the tragedy of the anti-commons＂
