摘要
审计作为经济市场的"警察",是防止财务舞弊不可或缺的工具之一。然而,近年来我国注册会计师与上市公司的审计合谋使审计逐渐丧失了其原有作用。自2007年1月1日起,我国实行了新企业会计准则,以及相应的新审计准则,新准则的技术难度加大,影响范围广泛,成为审计工作者以及监管机构的一大挑战。本文首先解释了审计合谋的现状,回顾了审计合谋监管问题的研究文献,然后对上市公司、注册会计师以及政府监管机构的行为分析,建立了两阶段动态博弈模型,且在监管过程中引入了信誉机制,利用三方既得利益的比较,得出影响审计质量的关键因素,最后参照英美等国的监管模式,试图找寻在新准则制度下降低审计合谋的监管策略。
As the police of economic market, audit is one of the necessary tools which could prevent financial fraud. However, in recent years, the audit converging between CPA and listed companies makes audit lose its own function. On January 1^at, 2007, China began to execute the New Corporation Accounting Standard and the New Audit Standard which are more complicated and influential. So how to cma-y out the standards success- fully is considered as auditors and supervising organizations＇ challenge. Firstly, the article explains the actuality of audit converging reviews the docu- ments and summarizes their standpoints. Secondly, it analyses actions of listed companies, CPA and supervising organizations, constructs a two - peri- od dynamic model, introduces the credit system and then gets the critical factor through comparing their benefits. At last, learning from other countries＇ modes, the article tries to find the supervising strategy decreasing audit converging.
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
2008年第1期62-64,共3页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
关键词
审计合谋
监管
博弈
信誉机制
audit converging
supervision
game theory
credit system
