摘要
会计信息失真是全球存在的一种普遍现象,而当前研究更多是基于定性上的分析。本文通过引入重复博弈构建了企业管理层会计信息造假的博弈模型并进行了分析,同时通过构建博弈模型开展了企业管理层与利益相关者进行会计信息造假合谋的研究,得到了避免企业管理层及其利益相关者会计信息失真的充分条件。最后,论文进行了政策性探讨。
Fraud accounting information exists all over the world.But most of the present studies bases on qualitative views. By introducing multiple game,this paper establishes a game model and analyses the behavior of making fraud accounting informa- tion by enterpriser's manager,and also creates a game model and analyses the cooperating behavior of making fraud accounting information by the enterpriser's manager and its benefit relative,thus gets the condition of avoiding fraud accounting information made by the manager and benefit relative.Finally,the paper gives some policy suggestions.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第6期78-83,共6页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
本文为国家社科基金项目(02CTJ003)部分研究成果。
关键词
企业管理层
利益相关者
会计信息失真
博弈分析
enterpriser's manager
benefit relative
fraud accounting information
game analysis
