摘要
处于经理人控制之下的自由现金流有可能被投入到损害公司价值的非盈利项目上,从而导致过度投资。股利代理成本理论认为,较高的股利支付水平可以迫使经理人"吐出"自由现金流,从而降低企业自由现金流代理成本。但本文实证研究表明,中国上市公司过度投资程度与现金股利支付水平无关。其原因在于,上市公司股利政策受到监管层政策驱动因素的影响,造成股利政策扭曲,并被"异化"为大股东"利益输送"的一种手段。
Free cash flow under the control of manager has the potential to be injected to non-profit projects, which may undermine corporate value and lead to over-investment. In line with theory on agency cost of dividend, a high rate of dividend payment could make the manager disgorge extra free cash flow, thus reducing the agency cost of free cash flow. However, empirical studies of Chinese listed companies reveal that over-investment has no direct relation with the rate of dividend payment. This is because the dividend policy of Chinese listed companies has been distorted by the regulatory measures and the cash dividend payment has been turned into a method of ＂tunneling＂ under the unbalanced ownership structure of listed companies.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第10期55-59,共5页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
过度投资
股利政策
自由现金流
over-investment
dividend policy
free cash flow
