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股利代理理论研究综述 被引量:5

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摘要 围绕企业的派现行为及其对企业价值、股东福利的影响,国外学术界已争论了几十年,“股利之谜”尚未完全破解。1961年,Miller和Modigliani在完全资本市场(perfect capital market)假设、理性行为(rational behavior)假设和充分肯定(perfect certainty)假设这三大假设的基础上,提出了“股利无关论”。通过放松这几个假定,
作者 苏月中
机构地区 上海财经大学
出处 《经济学动态》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第10期87-92,共6页 Economic Perspectives
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