摘要
本文旨在探讨公司治理因子与资本效益的关系。理论模型分析表明,若要提高公司的总资产周转率和资本效益,必须有效抑制经营者对津贴的追求度和强化投资者的价值最大化惩治力度。中国上市公司的数据充分说明公司治理机制欠缺的代理成本不会低于9%,各代理变量的实证分析也证明公司的生产效率和资本效益与经营者重视投资者利益的程度存在正向关系,与经营者追求自身利益最大化的自由度存在反向关系。因此为防止多重道德风险和逆向选择通过金融系统作用于公司治理机制,应对资本市场进行整体设计和对银行制度进行彻底改革。
This paper tries to explore the relationship between corporate governance and capital efficiency. The Analytical Model shows that the total turnover capital and the increase of efficiency, we must restrain gaining allowances by operators and reinforce the punishment to the investors seeking maximum the value. The data of China＇s listed companies corporate governance mechanism shows fully the lack agency cost is not less than 9%. An Empirical Analysis of the variables also prove that the company＇s production efficiency and effectiveness of capital importance to the interests of investors and operators to the extent there are positive, with the operator to maximize the freedom to pursue their own interests inverse relationship exists. Thus, to prevent multiple adverse selection and moral hazard role in corporate governance mechanisms through the financial system. It is necessary to design capital market and do the radical reform of the banking system.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第5期35-42,共8页
Systems Engineering
基金
湖南省社科基金资助项目(05BR17)
关键词
公司治理
资本效益
代理成本
Corporate Governance
Capital Endowment
Agent Cost
