摘要
现象学把近代思想的主客体的对立关系及其思维模式化解为意向活动与其构造的意向相关项之间的意向性联系,从而将自己定位在以心理体验活动为研究对象的心理学和以思维内客为研究对象的逻辑学之间。这个基本思维态度和思维方式也体现在现象学对语言、符号和意义的理解与分析上。本文试图通过对胡塞尔第一逻辑研究的意向分析的重构来展示现象学分析的这一基本特征,同时也指明语言问题在胡塞尔现象学中的重要位置。
henomenology dissolves the opposite relationship between subject and object in modem thoughts and its thinking - mode into the intentional correlation between noesis and noema constituted by noesis. In this way, it locates itself between psychology, which regards psychological experience actions as its research object, and logic, whose task is to investigate the thinking contents. The phenomenological understanding and analysis of language, sign and meaning also embodies this fundamental attitude and method of thinking. This article tries to reveal this basic character of phenomenological analysis through the reconstruction of the intentional analysis made by Husserl in the first logical investigation, and meanwhile to demonstrate the important position of the question of language in the phenomenology of Husserl.
出处
《现代哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第3期93-98,92,共7页
Modern Philosophy
关键词
现象学
语言含义
符号
phenomenology
language
meaning
symbol
