摘要
根据委托-代理理论建立了政府投资工程代建制模式下的委托-代理模型,分析了相关变量对激励强度的影响,并在激励模型中引入监理方,从而减小委托方和代理方的信息不对称,抑制道德风险,为我国代建制的发展提供有益的启示。
According to principal-agent theory, the principal-agent model was established. And the influence of related variables on the sensitiveness of compensation performance was analysized. Introducing surveillant into incentive model will decrease asymmetric information between prindpal and agent and suppress moral risk. It can provide beneficial inspiration for the development of agent construction management mode in our country.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第4期148-151,共4页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology
基金
武汉市建委科研项目(04-120)
关键词
政府投资工程
代建制
委托代理关系
激励机制
government investment projects
agent construction management mode
principal-agent relationship
incentive system
